Welcome to the Proxy Update, your source of news and information on Proxies and their role in network security.

Tuesday, August 17, 2010

Five billionth device about to plug into Internet

From: http://www.networkworld.com/news/2010/081610-5billion-devices-internet.html?source=NWWNLE_nlt_daily_am_2010-08-17

Sometime this month, the 5 billionth device will plug into the Internet. And in 10 years, that number will grow by more than a factor of four, according to IMS Research, which tracks the installed base of equipment that can access the Internet.

On the surface, this second tidal wave of growth will be driven by cell phones and new classes of consumer electronics, according to an IMS statement. But an even bigger driver will be largely invisible: machine-to-machine communications in various kinds of smart grids for energy management, surveillance and public safety, traffic and parking control, and sensor networks.

Earlier this year, Cisco forecast equally steep growth rates in personal devices and overall Internet traffic. [See "Global IP traffic to increase fivefold by 2013, Cisco predicts"]

Today, there are over 1 billion computers that regularly connect to the Internet. That class of devices, including PCs and laptops and their associated networking gear, continues to grow.

But cellular devices, such as Internet-connected smartphones, have outstripped that total and are growing at a much faster rate. Then add in tablets, eBook readers, Internet TVs, cameras, digital picture frames, and a host of other networked consumer electronics devices, and the IMS forecast of 22 billion Internet devices by 2010 doesn’t seem farfetched.

Slate Wars: 15 Tablets That Could Rival Apple's iPad

The research firm projects that in 10 years, there will be 6 billion cell phones, most of them with Internet connectivity. An estimated 2.5 billion televisions today will largely be replaced by TV sets that are Internet capable, either directly or through a set-top box. More and more of the world’s one billion automobiles will be replaced by newer models with integrated Internet access.

Yet, the greatest growth potential is in machine-to-machine, according to IMS President Ian Weightman. Research firm Gartner named machine-to-machine communications one of the top 10 mobile technologies to watch in 2010. And almost exactly one year ago, Qualcomm and Verizon created a joint-venture company specifically to support machine-to-machine wireless services.

"This has the potential to go way beyond industrial applications to encompass [such applications as] increasingly sophisticated smart grids, networked security cameras and sensors, connected home appliances and HVAC equipment, and ITS infrastructure for traffic and parking management," Weightman said in a statement.

Monday, August 16, 2010

IPV6 Proxy

Mention IPv6, and I believe most people will know what you are referring to. But that's all, they basically will be limited to a general recognition of what you're talking about. Starting with the mid 90s of the last century after the birth of IPv6, the discussion on the topic of IPv6 has been hot, but amongst the majority of users, there are few who can really use IPv6 applications!

Where does the problem lie? On the one hand, the application and deployment of IPv6 itself is small; and on the other, or even more crucial is the interoperability between traditional IPv4 applications and the IPv6 network, which make IPv6 networks and applications basically their own little islands: the traditional IPv4 users do not have access, and currently the development of new IPv6 networks is not widespread.

The root cause of this situation, was in fact, an incompatible IPv6 protocol with existing IPv4 technology. 51CTO.com reported previously, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) admitted that they committed a fatal error in the IPv6 standards, in not providing in the existing Internet protocol a way to have IPv4 backward compatibility. An IPv6 senior architect from Blue Coat in the United States, Qing Li, a security expert, in an interview, said: "The lack of real applications for IPv6-oriented solutions, forces enterprises to consider in the end either the use of an appropriate relocation program [to IPv6 networks] or to conduct a comprehensive upgrade. There are huge and comprehensive upgrade costs, enough to make most companies look and stop."

In other words, the current key issue is how to solve getting users from IPv4 to IPv6, basically a transition and convergence between the two. Mr Li said: "To smooth the shift to IPv6, requires a safe migration of business applications and services strategy." Well, is there a solution to this problem?

The answer is yes. It is called an IPv6 Proxy.

The IPv6 proxy is a proxy between IPv4 and IPv6 networks, allowing for transition and conversion with the use of a single piece of equipment. Mr Li explained that the intelligence behind the IPv6 proxy, is that it allows the the user access between networks, without the need for an address translation, administrators do not have to rewrite applications or upgrade IT Infrastructure, and IPv6 applications can be accessed with IPv4 networks today. Services and data in both the IPv4 and IPv6 environments can now interact smoothly today, and have an an easy migration tomorrow.

In other words, the IPv6 proxy acts as the client and server, regardless of whether the client is IPv4 or IPv6, so that an IPv6 client agent without special equipment can communicate to an IPv4 server. And similarly, when a traditional IPv4 client communicating with an IPv6 server application sends a request, the IPv4 to IPv6 proxy will be able to intercept the request, and then convert the request to an IPv6 request to the server; when the server returns the information, it also goes through the IPv6 proxy, eventually returning to the client.

How does this conversion work? Mr Li explained that on the Blue Coat IPv6 proxy, the TCP protocol is used in the suspension and re-packaging of packets. As we all know, TCP protocol works in the fourth layer on top of the IP protocol negotiation, while other applications are built on TCP or UDP protocols. The Blue Coat IPv6 proxy issues the TCP receive client request to the one side, and then analyzes the application layer protocol request, and then accesses security policies that meet the request of the new negotiation with the packet, and issues appropriate requests to the server, while clients also receive a normal response.

In the client view, the issue of requests and responses are normal as expected (either IPv4 or IPv6), without any address translation or other intervention on the client, so everything is transparent. And on the server, the client appears to send a request that meets and conforms with the IPv6 protocol itself. For existing enterprise IPv4 applications, the IPv6 proxy device can issue IPv4 requests from IPv6 clients, allowing for a more secure IPv6 backbone network, and allow IPv4 applications the use of IPv6 applications and services as well.

With the IPv6 proxy the challenge of IPv4 and IPv6 interaction appears to be solved. But a company may ask: with conversion between the two protocols, are there any safety concerns? Moreover, with the deployment of such a device, will the network transmission speed and quality be affected? Will a proxy affect existing applications? Will it greatly increase the network cost?

Mr Li explained that on the IPv6 agent equipment and network, companies may be faced with a challenge. He sums them up into four areas, that need to be examined using the initials "SUVA".

First, companies have the issue of content security control (Security), that is, how to use IPv6 and the proxy to ensure that enterprise applications meet the business management system and compliance needs, and also eliminate the need for re-certification of existing security policy.

Followed by availability (Usability), making sure the product application is convenient and reliable, and the original applications look transparent and convenient.

Third is the application of visibility (Visibility), which is very high in terms of IPv6 proxy requests. The proxy with all the applications through it require visual management to help network administrators with the application flow and a comprehensive understanding of Web content and control. Achieving effective application performance monitoring and adjusting network resources is key.

Finally, application layer protocol, where a business needs to accelerate applications (Acceleration). Acting as an intelligent device, IPv6 proxy should also provide acceleration capability so the network and application capabilities provide the best experience for end-users.

It should be said that these challenges also contributed to the development of the IPv6 proxy, an important reason for the relative difficulty in bringing the product to market. Mr Li explained that, Blue Coat's first-generation IPv6 proxy required R & D to spend five years developing the product. The key point of their success in the intelligent IPv6 proxy access to client requests, is not just a simple address translation, but a number of management issues, including the analysis of applications, auditing and security management, and content caching strategies such as acceleration. In the end, for network access, only if the functionality of a device meets the enterprise security management requirements, will the proxy request will be issued, and optimized.

Editor's note: This article is translated from Chinese, and the grammar has been corrected, but we haven't taken the extensive time necessary to make this article flow and read like fluent English.

Tuesday, August 10, 2010

Top Ten Web Malware Threats

From: http://www.esecurityplanet.com/print.php/3897476

Websites that spread malware may be leveling off, but Web-borne malware encounters are still growing. According to a 2Q10 Global Threat Report published by Cisco, criminals are using search engine optimization and social engineering to become more efficient, luring more targeted victims to fewer URLs.

Using IronPort SenderBase, Cisco estimated that search engine queries lead to 74 percent of Web malware encounters in 1Q10. Fortunately, two-thirds of those encounters either did not deliver exploit code or were blocked. But that means 35 percent of Web-borne exploits are still reaching browsers, where they try to drop files, steal information, propagate themselves, or await further instructions.

Browser phishing filters, anti-malware engines, and up-to-date patches can play a huge role in defeating malware reaching the desktop. However, to find unguarded vectors and unpatched vulnerabilities, let's look at how today's most prevalent Web malware works.

#10: Last on Cisco's list of 2Q10 encounters is Backdoor.TDSSConf.A. This Trojan belongs to the TDSS family of kernel-mode rootkits, TDSS files are dropped by another Trojan (see Alureon, below). Once installed, TDSS conceals associated files and keys and disables anti-virus programs by using rootkit tactics. Removing TDSS from a PC is difficult; using up-to-date anti-malware to block the file drop is a better bet.

#9: Ninth place goes to an oldie but goodie, Mal/Iframe-F. Many variants use this popular technique: inserting an invisible HTML iframe tag into an otherwise legitimate Web page to surreptitiously redirect visitors to other Websites. Hidden iframes may elude detection by the human eye, but Web content scanners can spot them and Web URL filters can block redirects to blacklisted sites.

#8: In a dead heat with Iframe-F is JS.Redirector.BD, a JavaScript Trojan that also redirects users to Websites they had not intended to visit. Like some other members of the large JS.Redirector family, this Trojan tries to evade blacklist filters by using obfuscation techniques like dynamically-generated target URLs.

#7: Nosing past Redirector.BD is Backdoor.Win32.Alureon. Alureon refers to a family of dynamic, multi-faceted Trojans intended to generate revenue from a victim's Web activities. Malware components within each instance vary, but Alureon has been seen to alter DNS settings, hijack search requests, display malicious ads, intercept confidential data, download arbitrary files, and corrupt disk drivers. In fact, threat reports indicate that Alureon has been used to drop TDSS onto infected PCs.

#6: Tied for middle-of-the-pack is Worm.Win32.VBNA.b. VBNA implants itself in a user's Documents and Settings folder, adding a Run key to the registry. Thereafter, VBNA auto-launches and propagates itself to neighboring PCs via writable fileshares. VBNA also displays a fake virus infection warning to trick users into purchasing fake anti-malware (which is often just more malware). Scare tactics like this appear to be on the rise, preying upon uninformed users.

#5: Next up is JS.Redirector.AT, another member of this Trojan family famous for redirecting users to other Web sites. Destination sites reportedly have displayed porn, phished for confidential data, and implanted malware on the victim's PC. One way to inhibit these Trojans is to disable JavaScript execution – if not in the browser, then in Acrobat Reader to block JavaScript hidden in PDFs. Exploits targeting Adobe PDF, Flash, and Sun Java vulnerabilities were particularly hot in 1H10.

#4: Taking fourth place is Mal/GIFIframe-A, a sibling to the afore-mentioned Iframe-F. GIFIframe-A also uses iframe tags, but this family of malware exploits iframes that have been injected into files encoded using popular graphic formats like GIF and JPG. When a user visits an infected Website and attempts to load the graphic, the injected iframe is processed, executing attacker-supplied code.

#3: At third, representing three percent of 2Q10 encounters, is a keylogger called PSW.Win32.Infostealer.bnkb. Dozens of Infostealer variant Trojans exist, targeting a wide variety of institutions and their customers. All work by capturing keystrokes, scanning for specific Web transactions, and stealing usernames, passwords, account numbers – typically those associated with online banking.

#2: A new JS.Redirector variant took second place in 2Q10: JS.Redirector.cq. Like other family members, this Trojan uses malicious JavaScript to redirect users. In this case, users find themselves at Websites that pretend to scan for viruses, then download fake anti-virus code, no matter where the user clicks on the displayed window. But how do legitimate Websites get infected with JS.Redirector in the first place? One reportedly common vector: SQL injection.

#1: First place goes to the now infamous Trojan downloader Exploit.JS.Gumblar. According the Cisco, Gumblar represented 5 percent of all Web malware in 2Q10, down from 11 percent in 1Q10. Gumblar is a downloader that drops an encrypted file onto the victim's system. Gumblar runs that executable without user consent, injecting JavaScript into HTML pages to be returned by a Web server or displayed by a user's Web browser. The injected JavaScript usually contains an obfuscated exploit; early scripts downloaded more malware from gumblar.cn – thus giving this Trojan its name.

Cisco's 2Q10 list was generated by IronPort, which uses Sophos, Webroot, and McAfee malware detection engines. Other vendors use different naming conventions and publish slightly different lists that represent other monitored data sources. And next quarter there will be new lists -- probably composed largely of variants.

The purpose of such lists is not therefore to tell you which malwares to scan for. That job falls to continuously-updated anti-malware defenses, installed on desktops, servers, and gateways. Instead, use this list and others like it to identify and proactively fight trends that are likely to persist or grow and target your Web servers and users tomorrow.

Wednesday, August 4, 2010

The 2010 Verizon Data Breach Report Is Out

From: http://isc.sans.edu/diary.html?storyid=9283

This year's data breach report continues this valuable narrative. This years report is based on a larger case sample than in previous years, thanks to a partnership with the United States Secret Service, who contributed information on a few hundred of their cases this year. Many of the findings echo those of previous years (excerpts below).


Who is behind Data Breaches?
70% resulted from external agents
48% caused by insiders
11% implicated business partners
27% involved multiple parties

How do breaches occur?
48% involved privilege misuse
40% resulted from hacking
38% utilized malware
28% involved social tactics
15% comprised physical attacks

What commonalities exist? (this was the interesting section for me)
98% of all data breached came from servers
85% of attacks were not considered highly difficult
61% were discovered by a third party
86% of victims had evidence of the breach in their log files
96% of breaches were avoidable through simple or intermediate controls
79% of victims subject to PCI DSS had not achieved compliance

Come on! Not only don't folks seem to be implementing some basic protections, but when they're told that they've been compromised (in their log files), no-one is listening! I guess this isn't much different than in previous years, but it'd be nice to see a positive trend here.

I'm not sure that I believe the low numbers for government data breaches (4%). I guess the report can only summarize data from cases that are "seen" by the incident handlers.

Find the full report here ==> http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_2010-data-breach-report_en_xg.pdf

Take a few minutes to read it over coffee this morning - I found it a good read, and just about the right length for that first cup !

Tuesday, August 3, 2010

Companies slow to create social media rules

From: http://www.detnews.com/article/20100802/BIZ04/8020349/1001/Companies-slow-to-create-social-media-rules


Companies beware: Employees aren't the only ones who should worry about a social media backlash.

Studies show that creating social media policies for employees helps companies prevent problems, but most firms would rather ignore the issue.

"I think it's hard to avoid," said Dean Pacific, a labor employment lawyer for Warner Norcross & Judd in Grand Rapids.

"I can't imagine telling anyone, 'Just completely stay away from social media. Pretend like it's not there.'"

But that's exactly what many companies are doing.

A Manpower survey of 34,400 companies worldwide found that 20 percent have a social media policy. Experts say ignoring the problem will only make it worse.

Instead, Pacific encourages companies to craft a social media policy that applies to both employees and management.

"We're still as a society trying to figure out what the limits and the boundaries are," said Michael Fertik, CEO and founder of ReputationDefender, a worldwide online reputation management and privacy company based in Redwood City, Calif.

"I don't think it's established yet because the technology's moving a lot faster than the law is."

Most companies with a social media policy reserve the right to monitor employee activity on work computers. Nothing workers write -- on e-mail, Facebook, Twitter or any other social network -- is private.

Some companies take it a step further by blocking social media sites on work computers.

ScanSafe, an online security company that provides a website blocking service to thousands of global corporations, found that 76 percent of its clients block social media sites. These companies place a greater focus on hiding sites like Facebook and YouTube than online shopping, weapons and alcohol.

"They view it similar to pornographic or gambling or shopping sites," Pacific said. "The big concern is that they're time wasters -- they're productivity busters."

Ford Motor Co. is among the businesses that realizes it can't prevent employees from using social media. So, the Dearborn automaker asks workers to explain that the views expressed are their personal opinions -- not those of the company.

"We're not authorizing an employee to be a spokesperson," said Scott Monty, who manages Ford's social media programs. "We want to make it clear that if they choose, they can talk about Ford, but they have to do so from a personal perspective."

Most companies also forbid employees from sharing trade secrets.

Pacific said many leaks are inadvertent. Employees who leave a company and are looking for new jobs might mention on their LinkedIn resumes that they were responsible for "$190 million in sales." Others who are still with the company might use Facebook to tout a cool product they are developing.

"It may not be bad intentions at all -- and it probably isn't -- but it can lead to harm to the company if this confidential information gets out there," Pacific said.

Other times the information that gets leaked isn't true at all. "But it still hurts the reputation of the company, because it looks real," Fertik said.

One of the biggest problems companies face are privacy violations. A growing number of employers check sites like Facebook and MySpace to screen job candidates, but experts say companies should be careful not to invade their privacy.

"Just on the very first page, you're going to see their sex, date of birth, marital status and their religious views," Pacific said. Asking about a job candidate's age, marital status and religious views in an employment interview is illegal.

Bosses who spy on employees by sneaking onto their private profiles and digging through personal information could jeopardize the company's finances. And bitter candidates who discover they didn't get a job because of something on their profile might file a discrimination lawsuit.

So Pacific recommends companies take precautions by having one employee collect information from the site and another review the information.

Monday, August 2, 2010

The Rising Role of Compliance Social Computing

From: http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/64427



When it comes to implementing a social computing strategy, many companies still abide by the security axiom of “only allow what is specifically permitted.” In fact, according to our latest research, 40 percent of (all?) companies block all access to public social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, or MySpace. These companies tend to have conservative views toward technology, and consider the risk of allowing access too great—often from both security and productivity standpoints.

Even many of the 60 percent of companies that now allow access restrict it in some way, either by time of day, approved groups (e.g. marketing, customer service, sales), or for specific use cases. We often hear from IT leaders that initial efforts to block access entirely were thwarted by legitimate business needs for the organization to participate in public social networks. In some cases, the path is reactive; access is wide open until someone in legal and/or compliance functions becomes aware of this usage. Often then the reaction is a knee-jerk, “full stop” for any social-computing activities.

There are four primary areas involved in addressing security and compliance concerns related to social computing:

• Breach. Forty-six states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have adopted legislation requiring notification of security breaches involving personal information. In addition, federal regulations, such as the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health, contain breach notification clauses.

• Attack. Compliance with legislation and regulations, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS), mandate organizations implement security best practices to prevent access to sensitive data.

• Unacceptable use. Typically, this is an internal policy that defines the acceptable use of corporate assets. Employees sign off on the policy and its ramifications, often as part of an employment contract.

• Accountability. Specific compliance requirements, such as Financial Services Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 10-6, require logging of trader communications. This may also include an internal compliance requirement to monitor and log communications with a high likelihood of becoming part of litigation and e-discovery.

One of the greatest concerns about social networking is the risk of a sensitive data breach. Social-computing applications are potential conduits to breach sensitive information—specifically, personally identifiable information and protected health information . Examples include a real-time breach in which sensitive information transfers in the clear during, for instance, an IM chat. Another example is a non-real-time breach in which a file transfers (intentionally or unintentionally) as part of a Skype session, for instance. Remember, the breach is the disclosure, not the exploitation of the data.

In addition to the breach challenge itself, there is also the challenge of tracking a breach. Without proper audit controls on all social-computing communications, the organization most likely will be totally unaware of any sensitive data breach. There is an additional concern that even when a company knows of a breach, they may have little recourse to limit its exposure. For example, a team within a manufacturing company sets up a Facebook group to facilitate collaboration on the design of its newest, and revolutionary, manufacturing process. There is an assumption of privacy since the group is closed with the exception of the team’s access. However, all it takes is one user without properly set privacy settings whose account is compromised to enable leakage of the group’s information. Users may not go through the due diligence required to determine data ownership for materials placed on public social sites.

Sites such as Facebook and LinkedIn are primary targets for cyber criminals. The primary attack vector is sending a legitimate looking link—from a “friend”—that takes the user to an infected Web page. The user opens the Web page, clicks on a link and inadvertently downloads malware, exposing the enterprise to significant risk. As discussed, blocking access to these sites is not absolute so the only option in this case is to block access to bad URLs.

Security practitioners who participate in Nemertes’ research indicate this attack vector is becoming one of their greatest challenges. In addition, recent reports indicate millions of compromised or fake Facebook accounts are available for sale. Protecting against these attacks requires, at a minimum, a Web-content-aware firewall with granular filtering to dynamically block access to specific Web pages, and even specific areas of an individual Web page. Companies that provide solutions in this area include Blue Coat, FaceTime Communications in partnership with Blue Coat, Palo Alto Networks, Socialware, Trend Micro, Webroot, WebSense, and Zscaler.

As more companies shift from “block everything” to “block some things,” the need for a proactive social security and compliance strategy will continue to gain importance.

Thursday, July 22, 2010

Fake femme fatale shows social network risks

From: Fake femme fatale shows social network risks



By Jaikumar Vijayan, Computerworld
July 22, 2010 06:22 AM ET

Hundreds of people in the information security, military and intelligence fields recently found themselves with egg on their faces after sharing personal information with a fictitious Navy cyberthreat analyst named "Robin Sage," whose profile on prominent social networking sites was created by a security researcher to illustrate the risks of social networking.

In a conversation with Computerworld, Thomas Ryan, co-founder of Provide Security, said he used a few photos to portray the fictional Sage on Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter as an attractive, somewhat flirty cybergeek, with degrees from MIT and a prestigious prep school in New Hampshire. Then he established connections with some 300 men and women from the U.S. military, intelligence agencies, information security companies and government contractors.

The goal, said Ryan, was to determine how effective social networking sites can be in conducting covert intelligence-gathering activities.

Despite some patently obvious red flags -- such as noting that the 25-year-old Sage had worked professionally for 10 years -- the scheme worked. The connections to Sage, who was depicted as a real-life Abby Scuito, a fictional character in CBS's NCIS television series, were established in less than a month. Many friends freely shared personal information and photos, invited the fictional threat analyst to conferences and asked her to review documents. Some "friends" at major companies, including Google and Lockheed Martin, even expressed interest in hiring her, he noted.

A security researcher created a fake online profile for a fictional cyberthreat analyst named "Robin Sage."

Had Sage really been a foreign agent, she would have had access to a lot of very useful information, said Ryan, who is scheduled to present his findings next week at the BlackHat security conference in Las Vegas. Excerpts from his interview with Computerworld follow:

What prompted you to conduct the experiment? One of the biggest drivers was all the talk about cyberwarfare and cyberespionage -- and what's real and what's not real. I wanted to see how much intel you could gather from a person just by lurking on a social networking site. I [also] wanted to see who was most susceptible to clicking. I wanted to see how fast this thing would propagate. One of the things I found was that MIT and St. Paul's [prep school] were very cliquey. If they don't remember seeing you, they are not going to click. You had less of a chance of penetrating those groups than the actual intel and security communities.

How many connections and friends did Robin Sage make? On Facebook, 226; on LinkedIn, 206; and on Twitter, 204. The connections on Facebook were security and military, LinkedIn was mainly security and intel, and Twitter was mostly hackers.

Did Sage mostly seek out these friends, or were they more likely to make the first move? It was a combination of both. I did approach a few people, [mostly] from the security industry. They had the most connections. They are the speakers, the ones that are always sociable.

What type of information can one get through such connections? Pretty much everything. I had access to e-mail and bank accounts. I saw patterns in the kind of friends they had. The LinkedIn profiles would show patterns of new business relationships.

Why do you think Sage was so successful at making new connections? Because she was an attractive girl. It definitely had to do with looks.

Were most of the connections male? It wasn't all men. The male versus female split was 82% to 18%. The highest number of women were from the intelligence community. The only women who were there from the security community were people promoting conferences and stuff like that.

Do you think a fictional male character would have been as successful in attracting "friends"? It depends on who the male was and how he was portrayed.

What did Facebook do when they discovered what was going on? Facebook shut down the Robin page and my personal page. They said, due to security reasons, I am not allowed to use Facebook again. LinkedIn just deleted the Robin account but [a cached version] is still there on Google.

What's the takeaway from the experiment? The big takeaway is not to friend anybody unless you really know who they are. The same tactic was used to infiltrate a secret Israeli base. The people on the base were the only ones on a private Facebook page. Somebody was able to gain access to it and gather intel on the base.

Anything else? I was never able to friend anyone from the CIA or the FBI. I tried. It just didn't work. Toward the end of the experiment, there was this massive influx of Arabs from overseas that were trying to get on the Robin page where all the military stuff was. I didn't really care for it. That was a bit scary.

Jaikumar Vijayan covers data security and privacy issues, financial services security and e-voting for Computerworld. Follow Jaikumar on Twitter at @jaivijayan , or subscribe to Jaikumar's RSS feed . His e-mail address is jvijayan@computerworld.com .